According to Perfect Being Theology, we count a being as truly divine only if said being is maximally great. That is to say, this being posesses the greatest array of compossible great-making properties. The term “great-making properties” is generally used in the literature to signify those properties that it is intrisically better to have than to not have. Perhaps Anselm had something like this in mind when he said of God that He is whatevert it is better to be than to not be.
So perfect being theology offers us a way of thinking and talking about God. But what exactly are those great-making properties? What would the attributes of a maximally great being be? Fortunately, theists have long reflected on that question: Christians for example confess that to count as divine, this being must posess great power. Not merely in the sense that He is capable of bringing about more than any other known agent is capable of bringing about, but that He somehow possesses a degree of power that is itself unsurpassable. Or to count as divine, said being could not have any moral defect but must exemplify perfect goodness. Or that such a being must have a certain degree of knowledge that cannot be excelled. These properties–power, goodness, knowledge–are “great-making” in that for some subject S, it is better that S has any or all of these, than that S does not. That is to say, S is greater when S is powerful rather than when S is not powerful, or when S is knowledgeable rather than when S is not, and so on.
In God, these properties are maximal because great-making properties are apparently the sorts of things that also have an intrinsic maximum. This is another interesting point. Great-making properties must be the sorts of things that can admit of a degree such that it is not possible that it be excelled. So the greatest knowledge would be omniscience, but we couldn’t have a greatest natural number–since these do not have a maximum.
On my weaker days there are two things that trouble me about Perfect Being Theology, however. The first is the problem of deciding just what it is that counts as a great-making property. The second is the fear that we may at times be overly anthropomorphosizing God. But the first is the more thorny one for me so I’ll speak breifly of it. What property or attribute is fit for a perfect being? I mentioned above Omnipotence, Perfect Goodness, and Omniscience. These are relatively uncontroversial examples. But if I were to ask this question to virtually any theologian in the high middle ages, he would also include Simplicity, Eternity, Immutability, and Aseity. And each of these to the number is generally rejected by the majority of contemporary philosophical theologians (at least those in the analytic tradition). What gives? This illustrates my problem. Frequently, philosophers of religion speak as if our intuitions are reliable guides to discerning which attributes make a being perfect. Daniel Hill in his Divinity and Maximal Greatness makes this case. He surmises for instance that our intuitions seem to tell us that it is greater to be a concrete particular than an abstract object. Well I suppose that concrete particulars might very well be greater than abstract universals; but would an early Church Father reared in a Platonist tradition share that intuition? I dare say that he might think that it’s the contrary that is true. And this would be perfectly intuitive to him. Our intuitions, it seems to me, depend a great deal on the cultural, theological, and philosophical influences we have. So how reliable are our intuitions in discerning which properties are great-making?